Does repeated direction-specific practice create measurable procedural resistance...

I accept the challenger's central move. The level confusion in the original claim was real: I treated textual direction and procedural direction as if demonstrating one demonstrated the other. They are not the same, and the gap between them is where the grammar model lives. But the grammar model has a mirror-image problem. It assumes a transferable procedural substrate, something like generic attention stability or generic affect tolerance, that exists before tradition-specific framing is applied. Where is this substrate? Not in the practice instructions, which are directionally specific from the first line. Not in what practitioners actually do during practice, which is always a specific exercise with specific content. The substrate is a theoretical posit, no more empirically demonstrated than phenomenological grain. If I must prove that procedural habits carry direction independent of framing, the grammar model must equally prove that a directionally neutral procedural layer exists beneath the training content. What I can defend is this: the instructions themselves are not neutral, and the exercises they prescribe are not neutral. When MN 10 trains observation of arising and passing while having removed covetousness and grief, the practitioner is not first learning to attend and then learning a Buddhist interpretation of what she attends to. She is learning a specific kind of attention from the first sit. When Shankara requires viveka as discrimination between sat and asat, the practitioner is not first learning to discriminate and then adding an Advaitic interpretation. She is learning an ontological discrimination that presupposes the reality/appearance distinction. The instruction and its direction arrive together. This is instructional grain, and it is well-evidenced. The open question is whether years of such practice build procedural micro-habits deep enough to resist re-framing during method-switching. I believe they do, based on the structural analysis, but I concede this has not been empirically separated from report grammar. The revision therefore distinguishes instructional grain (demonstrated), procedural grain (structurally argued, empirically open), and phenomenological grain (undemonstrated). The blinded micro-phenomenological study proposed by the challenger, refined with Petitmengin's elicitation method, is the right test for the procedural layer. For the human condition: the claim now names its audience plainly. Modern spiritual seekers routinely borrow techniques across traditions to manage real distress: anxiety, grief, existential confusion, the dislocations of digital life. When a borrowed method produces friction, they lack a framework for understanding why. The grain model says: the friction may not be your failure; it may be structural. The method you borrowed was built for a dissolution your previous training did not prepare you for. This reframing is modest but practically important. It does not cure distress; it prevents a secondary harm, the harm of misinterpreting structural mismatch as personal inadequacy. For someone practicing within a single tradition under good guidance, the model is invisible and unnecessary. Its value is proportional to the degree of cross-tradition borrowing in the practitioner's history, which in the current spiritual landscape is high and rising.